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Jackson: Reflections on Reading

REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s program manager
for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
I cannot live without books.

M

president thomas jefferson

any people are unaware that the Chief of Naval Operations Professional
Reading Program (CNO-PRP) is the only professional reading initiative in any of the military services that goes beyond merely publishing a list of
important books. The CNO, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, USN, shares President
Jefferson’s feelings about the importance of books, and he has allocated Navy
funds to purchase centrally and distribute widely nearly twenty-two thousand
books to ships, squadrons, and stations around the world. As the result of this
investment, more than 420 lending libraries have been established throughout
the fleet, where sailors can borrow any of the eighteen books in the CNO-PRP’s
“Essential Books” category. Many of the additional twenty-four “Recommended
Books” can be downloaded as e-books or audiobooks from the Navy General
Library site on the Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) portal. It is always gratifying
to hear directly from sailors at all levels about how the books are being enjoyed at
the deck-plate level. Over the past few months, we have received a lot of feedback,
including the following:

• A Navy captain recently wrote: “I gained great insight from reading Navigating the Seven Seas: Leadership Lessons of the First African American Father
and Son to Serve at the Top in the U.S. Navy. Not only did I enjoy reading
Richard A. Clarke’s Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and
What to Do about It, but I found it significantly applicable to the work I do
in the cyber-security area at NORAD-NORTHCOM. I look forward to reading more books in this well thought-out and applicable reading program.”

• A command master chief in the Special Warfare community wrote: “Last
year we used the Navy recommended reading list to have our Chief selectees
choose a book during the MCPON 365 Program and give a short oral report
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to the Chiefs’ Mess on what they got out of the book, what they liked and
disliked about it and whether they would recommend that book to someone
else and why. This grew interest in having those books on hand and the command is working to build a library of our own. We thank the Navy for their
support in shipping these books to us.”

• A first class petty officer recently noted: “Thank you for the opportunity to
create a command reading library. The variety of books has something for
everyone, which our Sailors enjoy.”

• A Judge Advocate General’s Corps lieutenant wrote: “My command plans to
assign The Caine Mutiny as mandatory reading as part of a Professional Military Education program for our junior officers. On the Navy Reading website, it is noted that The Caine Mutiny has been used in classrooms, where
it has sparked intense arguments over questions of loyalty and integrity, the
responsibility of a crew to its captain, and of loyalty up and down the chain
of command.”

• A Navy captain in the Navy training community wrote: “Just wanted to drop
a quick note of thanks for your assistance in helping us establish our Professional Reading Library. This topic is near and dear to my heart. All the best.”

• A chief petty officer in the medical field wrote: “We have created a professional library and we are using our books to encourage professional development. A number of our Sailors have checked out books and are preparing to
do presentations to the detachment based on the information learned in their
reading.”
The examples above perfectly demonstrate that the purpose of the CNO-PRP
is being achieved. The books are being read, discussed, and shared throughout
the fleet, and they are generating the kind of informed discussion that makes
everyone in the Navy more professional and more productive. The return on the
Navy’s modest investment is truly manifold.

john e. jackson
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Adjudicating
Discovery War Games	
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We know how to
wargame traditional
attrition warfare

We want to wargame
novel operational and
strategic problems

The outcomes of interacting
player decisions are driven
by physics and statistics

Modern operational or strategic problems
are driven by complex interacting PMESII
issues, we do not know these rules for
complex modern problems

We know the physics and statistics rules that
govern battlefield dynamics so adjudication uses
these to decide the range of what could happen

Adjudication uses subject matter
expert judgment to decide the
range of what could happen

For deductive games adjudicators “roll the dice” to
decide what did happen in order to put players
into a statistically valid situation, they are umpires

For inductive games adjudicators decide what
did happen in order to force players into an
situation that satisfies the objective of the game

People playing or adjudicating
novel problems are by definition
unskilled at those problems

Subject Matter Experts and
Adjudicators tend to be older and
more experienced people

Slightly depressed and negative
people tend to be better able to think
skeptically, but are not good leaders
and often not hired as adjudicators

Adjudicators decide what
information to provide players
and give that to them

Players make decisions in response
to information about opponents
given to them by adjudicators

We want insights into novel problems
for which there are insufficient
statistics or historical case studies for
other forms of analysis

Adjudicators control the game, they
are the primary players in discovery
games, not just umpires

Older and more
experienced people tend
to be overconfident [15]

Overconfident people blur the
line between what they can
control and what they cannot [15]

Unskilled people grossly
overestimate their own skill
because they do not know
how little they know [14]

Treat the adjudication and white cell as players
whose behavior and demographics are collected and
analyzed in the same way as those of other players
People cannot predict the
decisions they or others
would make under different
information conditions [10]

Cannot use game decisions as a
predictor of decisions that players,
adjudicators or subject matter
experts would make in real life

The three risk factors are
present for fraudulent
decision making [18]

Wargames are not expected
to be precisely reproducible

LEGEND
What do we want?

What helps us get it?

Why do we want it?

What should we do?
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Why is this a problem?

Examine why decisions were made and not
made, what messages the actions were
intended to send, and what messages were
received for both players and adjudicators

Players, adjudicators and
sponsors are often under
career pressure

Can use beliefs exhibited during a game
as a predictor of how players,
adjudicators and subject matter experts
would interpret information in real life

Players, adjudicators and
sponsors often believe they
already know the answer [18]

Peoples’ beliefs are robust,
even under contradictory
information [19]

Peoples’ statements about their
beliefs are unreliable and so
cannot be directly used [5]
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